

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-072

4 April 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM:
Chairman

SUBJECT: Leaks

1. At a recent SIS Officers' Course, Philip Taubman of the New York Times participated in a program on intelligence and the media. Among other things, Mr. Taubmann assured the group that he has sources of classified information among CIA employees. He said he is sometimes assisted in spotting CIA sources by analysts in other departments and agencies who tell him who is dealing with specific issues or topics at CIA. He then calls up the CIA employees at home in the evening, and finds that some of them are willing to talk.

2. This revelation, which we have no reason to doubt, is shocking. CIA regulations, security indoctrination, the very environment in which we live, all should leave no doubt in the minds of CIA employees that unauthorized chats with newsmen about classified information are a serious breach of trust. The lack of perception by personnel of other Intelligence Community elements in discussing who is doing what at CIA is equally distressing.

3. Security education efforts throughout the Community should be revised to incorporate warnings about the damage that can result from discussing classified information or even unclassified information about CIA business with the media. I will bring this matter to the attention of the Security Committee and its Security Awareness Subcommittee at their forthcoming meetings, with a request that people in their agencies be warned about these press tactics and the ill-advised responses that make them successful. If further action is desired, please advise.

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Executive Registry

84-2886

3 July 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Security Committee

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Leaks

1. Here are some more leak incidents, together with your good memo of 12 June. I am glad that you have done all the broader work on the whole issue of unauthorized disclosures. I will want to discuss this at the PFIAB meeting on Thursday, 12 July.

2. I want to use your broader review as the basis for presentation in the policy community and also as the basis for trying to develop an article for publication on the seriousness of the unauthorized disclosure problem. Such an article wouldn't be much good if we're not able to cite specifications but that may be quite delicate. I would like you to think about whether and how this can be handled. The PFIAB is about ready to go with its recommendation which is a very interesting one and we need to start putting all this together. I would like to do this during July. It will at least give me something to bring the PFIAB up to date on at the meeting on 12 July.



William J. Casey

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-132

12 June 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff

25X1 FROM:
Chairman

25X1 SUBJECT: Leaks

REFERENCE: DCI Memo, same subject, dated 8 June 1984 (ER-84-2547/2)

25X1 1. This memorandum provides responses to the questions in paragraph 2 of reference. Work will begin immediately on a broad review of the whole issue of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence.

25X1 2. The status of leak investigations in CIA, including the use of the polygraph, reflects a firm, deliberate approach. Since January 1983, the Office of Security has processed more than 182 reported publications of classified CIA information. Evaluation of these articles resulted in 74 cases (40.6%) being authenticated as actual leaks. All were internally investigated by the Office of Security and reported to the Office of General Counsel for referral to the Justice Department.

25X1 3. Since 1978, six Agency employees have been identified as having made unauthorized disclosures to the news media. In three of these cases, key information was developed through polygraph examinations. Two of the six resigned and the others received administrative penalties.

25X1 4. Questions concerning the unauthorized disclosure of classified information are an integral part of both the entrance on duty (EOD) and the reinvestigation program (RIP) polygraph examinations. Security indoctrination stresses protection of classified information from unauthorized disclosure.

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25X1 5. The broad dissemination of intelligence ensures that only rarely is
25X1 there a small enough number of suspects in a leak case to permit the effective
use of the polygraph. In 1983, only one leak investigation, conducted in
conjunction with the FBI, included use of the polygraph. In 1982, however,
two of the six individuals cited earlier were detected through EOD polygraph
examinations. []

25X1 9. The control and reporting of press contacts is under continuing
25X1 review by the Office of Public Affairs, and [] reports the program
is working well. The system produces 10 to 12 reports per year of press
contacts seeking information from CIA employees. These generally appear
innocuous. Reports of casual contact with media representatives, at social
25X1 functions or as neighbors, etc., are more frequent but do not involve requests
for information. []


25X1 10. Occasionally, OPA receives reports from CIA employees that newsmen
were referred to them by colleagues in other agencies. OPA has agreed to try
to determine the identity of the referring party in future cases. We should
then advise the supervisors and security officers of these individuals that
such referrals, while not direct violations of security, are certainly
25X1 indiscretions to be avoided. []

25X1 11. The Philip Taubman incident occurred when he was a guest speaker at
a training course for new SIS officers. Attached at Tab B is my memorandum to
the DDCI on the subject and a Headquarters Notice which was based upon it.
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14. Clair George advises that OLL continues to work with the Congressional oversight committees on ways to ensure the protection of classified intelligence material. [redacted]

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15. Additional items on unauthorized disclosures:

a. SECOM expects the completion of coordination of its leak study within a few weeks. The study will show, among other things, that from FY 1979 through FY 1983, a large number of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence was published; that the number of disclosures was increasing; and that the time between production of intelligence reports and media publication of their contents was decreasing. The report should help in raising awareness of the nature and extent of the leak problem.

b. In an effort to continue the work begun by the leak study and to provide a way to conduct meaningful collection and analysis of data on current publications of unauthorized disclosures, the Director, IC Staff has requested the FBI to assign an officer to SECOM to institute an ongoing leak analysis center. We are also seeking to contract with [redacted] to assist in this project. [redacted] former curator of the Historical Intelligence Collection, was a security analyst for many years and has a deep interest in and knowledge of media publications regarding intelligence matters.

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c. In addition to the possibility of a PFIAB legislative proposal on leaks, the American Bar Association and the SSCI staff both are attempting to draft legislation to deal with the problem.

d. The SECOM recently published a report on the utility of the polygraph, describing cases in which individuals with serious disqualifying factors would have been given access to sensitive national security information if it had not been for the polygraph.


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25X1_ e. The counterleak presentation, using the videotape you made in July 1983 and excerpts from the PBS television feature on government secrecy and freedom of the press, has been given by [redacted] and me about 32 times to a total of about 1400 people. The program has been well received, but is becoming dated, due to the examples used and the emphasis on NSDD-84. It is recommended that you consider making a new videotape. [redacted]

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Attachments:

- A. OS Leak Report
- B. SECOM Memo to DDCI

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SECOM-D-132, 12 June 1984

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Prepared by:

Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee, w/atts
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11 JUN 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee

25X1 FROM: [redacted]
Director of Security

25X1 SUBJECT: Leaks [redacted]

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Chairman/SECOM from DCI,
dated 8 June 1984, same subject

1. Paragraph 2 of reference directs that you render a report as to the status of investigation of possible leaks in CIA including the use of the polygraph. The following paragraphs detail information relative to this Agency's investigation of leaks that may be pertinent to the formulation of your report.

2. During the period 1978 to present, a total of six Agency employees were identified as having made unauthorized disclosures to members of the news media. In three cases the information was initially developed through polygraph examinations. Two of the individuals identified resigned, one retiree was disapproved for rehire as a contract annuitant, one individual was allowed to retire but was reduced one grade on retirement, one individual was given five days leave without pay and departed the Agency shortly thereafter, and one individual was delayed in converting from contract to staff status until it was determined that his participation was secondary to the primary culpable individual. The latter individual was an employee of another agency when the leak occurred.

3. Questions concerning unauthorized disclosure of classified information are an integral part of both the entry on duty and reinvestigation polygraph examinations. Part of the reinvestigation polygraph examination is specifically designed to determine if an individual has provided classified information to the media. Through our security education program, each employee is indoctrinated relative to his or her responsibility to protect classified information. From the time he or she enters on duty with this Agency, each individual is made aware that the reinvestigation process, including polygraph examination, is in part, to determine if the individual has provided classified information to an unauthorized person. This awareness is a significant deterrent factor enjoyed by this Agency over those agencies that do not have a polygraph program.

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4. Due to the consistently wide dissemination of information determined to have been leaked, it is a rare occurrence when the number of suspects in a leak investigation can be narrowed to a small enough number for polygraphing to be considered as a prudent course of action. In 1983 only one case resulted in polygraphing and was in conjunction with a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigation of a leak. In 1984 to date only in one case, which is current and ongoing, is polygraphing planned. However, in 1982 two of the individuals cited in paragraph 2 were detected in routine pre-entry on duty polygraph examinations. This serves to point out the spinoff effect of the Agency's polygraph program as a detector of and deterrent to leakers. []

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5. Since January 1983 the Office of Security has processed over 182 media articles containing purported and perceived passages that were initially thought to be based on classified information which originated within the CIA. Each article was evaluated to authenticate that classified CIA intelligence had been compromised. This culling process resulted in determining that 74 cases or 40.6 percent of all cases evaluated contained leaked CIA classified information. These cases were internally investigated by the Office of Security and reported to the Office of General Counsel for referral to the Department of Justice. []

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6. Fifty reporters working for 25 different media outlets have been responsible for these stories. Eighty percent of all leak stories have come from five major media outlets:

<u>Media Outlet</u>	<u>Number of Articles/Reports</u>
<u>Washington Post</u>	86
<u>CBS News</u>	23
<u>New York Times</u>	18
<u>Washington Times</u>	11
<u>Aviation Week</u>	9

The remaining media outlets (20) have averaged 1.5 leak articles during the past 18-month period. []

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7. Forty-nine percent of all leak articles for the same period come from 10 reporters:

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12. Lead information suggests that some of these leaks may have originated from Congressional committees which received briefings from CIA officials. The articles detected in 1983 resulted in leads that the origin of the disclosures was in the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). The 1984 articles have leads pointing toward the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). Although there has been a clear transformation of firsthand lead information from 1983 to 1984, records reflect that HPSCI has received the same briefings as the SSCI prior to each media report. The Office of Security reports have reflected unbiased factual reporting of events.


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13. The FBI is currently investigating several of the 1983 disclosures. Personnel in the Directorate of Operations/Latin America Division have been interviewed and reportedly one congressman was recently interviewed. The 1984 cases on Central America have all been forwarded to the Office of General Counsel for referral to the Department of Justice. The Department of Justice recently responded to one article requesting that the CIA reconsider a referral in light of the fact that the Agency's involvement in the covert operation had been confirmed publicly by the administration. This Department of Justice response is disturbing. Each 1984 article disclosing classified CIA intelligence on Central America has reportedly been confirmed by one or more unidentified administration officials. This does not address the problem of the leak but establishes a precedence of inaction on cases referred which are politically sensitive. To date, there has not been a CIA response to the Department of Justice.

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14. The Office of Security has also obtained other investigative leads and patterns of disclosure on other reporters:

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15. Other cases have been investigated and the results forwarded to the Office of General Counsel for referral to the Department of Justice. Offhand, no other clear-cut patterns come to mind. If you need more information, please let me know.

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